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Abstract 
Using a dataset of 3,404 acts of maritime piracy from 1996 to 2008, this paper investigates whether piracy is related to 
the economic development and socio-political status of countries where attacks occur.
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     1. Introduction 
 
Over the last years, piracy at sea has gained increased attention from the media and policy 
makers around the world due to changes that occurred in the nature and location of such acts. 
Initially  concentrated  in  the  Red  Sea,  Indian  Ocean  and  Malacca  and  Singapore  Straits, 
attacks off the coast of Somalia, where several  vessels were hijacked or fired upon, now 
represent a threat to international shipping. These attacks have led some ship-owners to avoid 
sailing through the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal as well as an increase in insurance 
premiums. This represents a cost estimated between 1 to 16 billion US$ per year for the 
shipping industry (Bone 2008, Bendall 2009, Hanson 2009).  
 
Although piracy affects shipping first, observers often suggest that its root cause is not to be 
found at sea. The level of poverty, economic hardship and socio-political instability prevailing 
in countries where pirates live would be the main drivers (Anderson 1995, Eklöf 2006). For 
instance, Fouché (2009) highlights “political instability and poverty” as being highly relevant 
particularly  in  the  case  of  Somalia.  Kraska  and  Wilson  (2009,  p.  44)  assert  that  “piracy 
seldom takes place in isolation, frequently occurring in concert with poverty, weak or no 
governance and economic stagnation” and that the renaissance in piracy can be attributed in 
part to “the dire situation within Somalia”. 
 
Despite an expected role of socio-economic indicators to understand piracy, their relationship 
with  the  occurrence  of  acts  of  piracy  has  so  far  not  been  subject  to  much  investigation, 
contrary to other forms of terrorism (Nitsch and Schumacher 2004, Martin et al. 2008). One 
reason  is  undoubtedly  the  difficulty  in  gathering  reliable  statistics  on  piracy,  Mejia  et  al. 
(2008, 2009) being recent exceptions. This paper fills in the gap in studying the determinants 
of  acts  of  piracy  between  1996  and  2008  from  a  unique  dataset  on  acts  of  piracy  and 
economic and political indicators at the country level.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our dataset and 
changes in acts of piracy  over the period 1996-2008. Results from random effects Probit 
regressions are presented in Section 3, with a focus on the impact of country-specific political 
rights and civil liberties status. Finally, Section 4 provides our conclusions. 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
We  study  the  pattern  of  acts  of  piracy  in  shipping  using  a  dataset  collected  by  the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) from 1996 to 2008. The dataset contains information for 
each actual or attempted act of piracy and armed robbery against ships on the status of the 
ship  when  attacked  (steaming,  anchored…),  the  type  of  attack  (boarded,  fired  upon, 
hijacked…), the ship name and flag, where and when the attack took place along with a 
narration on circumstances. Since we know when and where each attack took place, we are 
then able to calculate the number of attacks or attempted attacks PIRit in the territorial waters 
of each country i in year t. The total number SiStPIRit is equal to 3,404 over the period under 
consideration. 
 
Figure 1 shows a general inverted U-shaped profile for acts of piracy over time. The “worst” 
years are 2000 (N=362) and 2003 (N=385), while the number of attacks was 208 in 2006, 233 
in 2007 and 199 in 2008. The surge in the number of acts of piracy highlighted by media 
illustrates the situation for the last two years only, with respectively 406 and 445 attacks in 
2009 and 2010.  
Figure 1. Acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships (1996-2008) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations from IMB (1996-2008) 
 
Piracy concerns only a limited number of countries
1. From our sample of 1,976 observations 
for 152 countries over 13 years, 75.6% of the country-year observations are not subject to acts 
of piracy, 17.3% between 1 and 5 acts, and 7.1% more than 5 acts. Indonesia is the first place 
of attacks with 1,011 acts (29.7%), but this country has experienced a strong decrease since 
2003. It is followed by Bangladesh (332 acts, 9.8%), Nigeria (239 acts, 7.0%), India (203 acts, 
6%) and Somalia (163 acts, 4.8%). The recent surge in number of acts is mainly attributed to 
African countries and in particular two countries, Nigeria and Somalia. 
 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on various economic and socio-political indicators 
of countries where attacks are taking place
2. The three socio-political indicators are those 
reported by the independent organization Freedom House. Political rights and civil liberties 
range from 1 (best situation) to 7 (worst), while freedom status is a synthetic indicator based 
on  previous  ratings.  In  ‘free’  countries,  political  competition  is  open,  civil  liberties  are 
respected and there are independent civic life and media. In ‘partly free’ countries, weak rule 
of law prevails and some restrictions on civil liberties and political rights exist. In ‘not free’ 
countries, political rights and civil liberties are denied. 
 
Descriptive  statistics  suggest  that  economic  development  and  political  indicators  have  an 
influence on the likelihood of finding acts of piracy in a country (see Table 1). The GDP per 
capita is nearly three times lower in countries subject to piracy (3,677 instead of 10,886 US$) 
as well as the GDP growth rate (2.491% versus 2.878%). Acts of piracy are also more likely 
for  countries  with  weak  political  rights  and  civil  liberties  indicators.  For  the  synthetic 
indicator, free countries account for 53.9% of the annual observations with no piracy attacks, 
but only 27.7% of the annual observations with attacks. 
                                                           
1 Some attacks could not be allocated to any specific country and had to be disregarded. The 91 attacks in the 
Gulf of Aden in 2008 are the most representative.  
2  All  these  statistics  were  retrieved  from  the  Global  Development  Network  Growth  database,  Development 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variables  No piracy  Piracy  All 
Economic indicators       
GDP PPP per capita (/1000)  10.886  3.677  9.078 
GDP growth (annual %)  2.878  2.491  2.782 
Political indicators       
Political rights  3.012  3.941  3.238 
Civil liberties  3.027  4.033  3.272 
Status  Free  0.539  0.277  0.475 
  Partially free  0.253  0.420  0.294 
  Not free  0.202  0.292  0.224 
Number of observations  1493  483  1976 
Source: authors’ calculations from IMB (1996-2008) 
 
3. Econometric analysis 
 
We turn to a multivariate analysis to investigate the determinants of acts of piracy at the 
country level. As many countries are not concerned with attacks, we focus on the probability 
of observing at least one act of piracy per year. Let     be a dummy variable such that     = 1 
when piracy in country      = 1,…,   at date    = 1,…,   is observed, and 0 otherwise. We 
suppose that a latent variable    
∗  measures the propensity of piracy such that: 
 
   
∗ =      +    +                   (1) 
 
with     a set of explanatory variables,   a vector of coefficients to estimate, and    and     
two residuals. In (1),    is a country-specific effect such that   ~  0;  
   and     is a pure 
error term such that    ~  0;1 . The error terms    and     are supposed to be independent of 
both each other and of the explanatory variables    . We have     = 1 when    
∗ ≥ 0 and 
    = 0 otherwise. Let     = −∞ and     = −     if     = 0, and     = −     and     = +∞ 
if     = 1. Then, the log likelihood of the model is   = ∑ ln Pr    ,…,        with: 
 
Pr    ,…,     =   Π   
   Φ     −     − Φ     −     
 ∞
 ∞              (2) 
 
with   .  and Φ  respectively the density function and distribution function of the univariate 
normal distribution. The corresponding specification is hence a random effect Probit model 
which is estimated using quadrature techniques
3. Our estimates are presented in Table 2. 
 
In a preliminary step (column 1 of table 2), we only account for economic variables and 
introduce year-specific dummies as additional covariates. These time coefficients will pick up 
the changing pattern of piracy over the whole period under consideration. For instance, the 
trend in piracy is likely to be affected by the fact that civil defence and military efforts against 
piracy  changed  from  1996  to  2008
4.  We  observe  a  negative  correlation  between  the 
                                                           
3 The assumption behind the random effect specification is that the country specific effects are uncorrelated with 
the selected explanatory variables. We further assess the relevance of this exogeneity assumption by estimating 
conditional Logit models. When performing Hausman tests, our results indicate that the difference between the 
random  effect  and  the  fixed  effect  coefficients  is  never  systematic,  and  therefore,  that  the  random  effect 
specification is appropriate. 
4 For instance, the Combined Task Force 150 was engaged in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia 
from 2006 to 2008. Ideally, one would like to allocate international anti-piracy efforts to individual countries, but 
so far, such information on national efforts is not available for the large sample of countries under consideration. probability that piracy occurs and the GDP per capita, which is significant at the 1 percent 
level. As expected, developed countries are less likely to experience acts of piracy in their 
territorial waters. The opposite pattern is found between piracy and a country’s GDP growth 
rate, but the relationship is not significant at conventional level. 
 
Table 2. Random effect Probit estimates of piracy 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant  -1.169***  -1.413***  -1.869***  -1.491***  -9.354*** 
  (-4.54)  (-4.19)  (-4.70)  (-5.02)  (-7.54) 
GDP PPP per capita/1000  -0.062***  -0.057***  -0.050***  -0.053***  -0.058*** 
  (-4.10)  (-3.67)  (-3.20)  (-3.48)  (-4.27) 
GDP growth (annual %)  -0.012  -0.012  -0.011  -0.012  -0.015** 
  (-1.60)  (-1.58)  (-1.50)  (-1.53)  (-1.96) 
Political rights (1: Best to 7: worst)    0.065       
    (1.12)       
Civil liberties (1: Best to 7: worst)      0.170**     
      (2.33)     
Status      Partially free        0.392*  0.199 
(ref: Free)        (1.92)  (1.00) 
     Not free        0.543**  0.158 
        (2.02)  (0.61) 
Year dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Additional controls  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  1863  1863  1863  1863  1863 
Countries  144  144  144  144  144 
Log likelihood  -618.4  -617.8  -615.8  -616.1  -587.29 
Source: authors’ calculations from IMB (1996-2008) 
Note:  estimates  from  random  effect  Probit  models,  with  t-statistics  in  parentheses.  Significance  levels  are 
respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Additional controls are log of population size, growth rate of 
population and log of surface in km². 
 
We respectively added the socio-political indicators in columns 2, 3 and 4 of table 2. We 
choose  to  introduce  the  three  indicators  separately  as  these  covariates  are  positively 
correlated. For instance, the R² of an estimated OLS on political rights as a function of civil 
liberties  is  equal  to  0.85.  While  the  coefficient  associated  with  political  rights  is  not 
statistically significant (column 2), the probability at the 5 percent level for a country to be 
subject  to  piracy  increases  when  civil  liberties  are  restricted  (column  3).  A  negative 
correlation exists between piracy and freedom status (column 4). Piracy is more likely to 
occur  in  partially  free  or  not  free  countries.  At  the  mean  of  the  sample,  the  probability 
increases respectively by 5.8 points of percentage for partially free countries and 9.1 points 
for not free countries.  
 
We then introduced three additional controls (column 5): log of population size, growth rate 
and log of surface. Our results are twofold. Firstly, the probability of piracy is positively 
correlated with population’s size (at the 1 percent level)
5. Secondly, the relationship between 
piracy  and  the  freedom  status  is  no  longer  significant.  We  get  very  similar  results  when 
introducing the ordered indicators of either political rights or civil liberties. As piracy is likely 
to be influenced by its lagged value, we then estimate a random effect dynamic Probit model 
with the following specification: 
 
   
∗ =        +      +    +                   (3) 
                                                           
5 Conversely, the correlation between piracy and both population growth and surface area is not significant at 
conventional level.  
with    > 1.  Note  that  the  lagged  coefficient  of  piracy  is  assumed  to  be  the  same  for  all 
countries. The error terms     are assumed serially independent, but the composite error term 
   +     is correlated over time due to the country-specific    terms. The solution proposed by 
Heckman (1981) consists in estimating jointly a linearized reduced form for the latent variable 
and for the first period of observation. Conditional on the country effects    and assuming that 
the error terms      are serially independent, the joint probability   Pr    ,…,     may  be 
expressed as the product of the first-period probability of observing     and the product of the 
other specific-period probabilities which depend on the lagged term       and on the selected 
covariates     (Stewart, 2006)
6. 
 
Table 3. Random effects dynamic Probit estimates of piracy 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant  -1.042***  -1.078***  -1.427***  -1.160***  -9.123*** 
  (-4.51)  (-3.82)  (-4.25)  (-4.56)  (-8.09) 
Lagged piracy  0.533***  0.539***  0.517***  0.560***  0.500*** 
  (4.19)  (4.43)  (4.33)  (4.68)  (4.18) 
GDP PPP per capita/1000  -0.033***  -0.035***  -0.028**  -0.036***  -0.041*** 
  (-4.92)  (-3.67)  (-2.25)  (-3.56)  (-4.93) 
GDP growth (annual %)  -0.006  -0.005  -0.002  -0.004  -0.010 
  (-0.75)  (-0.64)  (-0.30)  (-0.54)  (-1.31) 
Political rights (1: Best to 7: worst)    0.152***       
    (2.78)       
Civil liberties (1: Best to 7: worst)      0.251***     
      (5.09)     
Status      Partially free        0.404**  0.115 
(ref: Free)        (2.46)  (0.71) 
     Not free        0.845***  0.059 
        (3.61)  (0.30) 
Year dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Additional controls  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  1863  1863  1863  1863  1863 
Countries  144  144  144  144  144 
Log likelihood  -617.3  -615.0  -610.0  -613.7  -579.1 
Source: authors’ calculations from IMB (1996-2008) 
Note: estimates from random effects dynamic Probit models, with t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels 
are respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Additional controls are log of population size, growth rate of 
population and log of surface in km². 
 
The results reported in Table 3 show a strong state dependence in acts of piracy over time. 
The probability for a country to be concerned with piracy is much higher when there were 
some acts of piracy in that country the previous year. Furthermore, we still get a positive 
correlation between the freedom indicators and piracy and the relationship is now significant 
for both political rights, civil liberties and the freedom status (columns 2-4). However, this 
does not hold anymore when population size, population growth and surface are taken into 
account  (column  5).  Piracy  is  then  more  likely  in  countries  with  large  and  fast-growing 
population, while socio-political indicators are not significant.  
 
We  finally  estimated  the  relationship  between  the  number  of  acts  of  piracy  and 
economic/political indicators
7. Given the high proportion of zero values for acts of piracy, we 
                                                           
6  The  selected  covariates  to  explain  the  first-period  probability  have  to  include  the  explanatory  variables 
considered for the other periods and ‘instruments’. We included a measure of trade defined as the sum of imports 
and exports as percentage of GDP in the first-period equation. 
7 These additional results are available upon request. rely on random effects Tobit models with the log of acts of piracy as a dependent variable. 
Again, the number of acts of piracy is higher in countries with low GDP per capita. The GDP 
growth is negatively correlated with piracy at the 10 percent level and even at the 5 percent 
level  once  population  size,  population  growth  and  surface  are  controlled  for.  We  obtain 
positive coefficients for the various political indicators, but not significant at conventional 
levels.  
 
So,  our  results  suggest  that  the  economic  situation  of  a  country  is  more  important  when 
explaining  piracy  than  its  political  situation.  These  results  should  however  be  taken  with 
caution due to the limited changes observed in socio-political indicators over the selected 
period. Figure 2 illustrates this element for few cases. As shown in Figure 2, both freedom 
indicators remain poor in Somalia and to a less extent in Nigeria between 1996 and 2008. So, 
this  can  clearly  not  explain  the  recent  surge  of  piracy  in  both  countries.  Indonesia  and 
Bangladesh, which are very similar at first glance, offer two contrasting patterns. In both 
cases, the trend in acts of piracy is decreasing. However, while political rights have improved 
in  the  former  country,  they  have  strongly  deteriorated  in  the  latter  (and  civil  rights  have 
remained constant). 
 
Figure 2. Changes in political rights, civil liberties and acts of piracy 
 




This article deals with the shifting pattern and location of acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships. The observed shift from South-East Asia to Africa is confirmed by the recent 
surge in attacks in 2009 and 2010, with growing demands for ransoms amounting to millions 
of dollars. The root causes for such shift are however more difficult to identify. Our results 
show that acts of piracy are negatively related to the current level of GDP per capita. Poor 
situations related to political rights, civil liberties and freedom status tend to increase the 
likelihood of piracy, but the correlation remains weak and it is no longer significant once 
population and surface are taken into account. Finally, a strong state dependence in maritime 
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